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· Th~ defendant by the Information in this action was
charged with the commission of the crime of rape, upon his
8 year old daughter Cynthia Winget. The action was tried
in Sevier County, Utah, on November 26 and. 27th, 1956.
On November 27, 1956 the Jury returned a verdict of guilty,
and on December 10 1956 Motion f.or New Trial was denied
'
'
3.nd defendant was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment in
the Utah State Penitentiary. He appeals.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Cynthia Suzanne Winget is the 8 year old daughter of
defendant and his former wife, Marjorie L. Winget. She
testified that on Sunday September 2, 1956, she and her two
brothers went to visit her father, the defendant, at their
.grandfather's home. The defendant was alone in the home
and that while her two younger b1.1others were outside playing, her father had improper relations with her. She didn't
relate this to her mother until the following Monday evening when she noticed a bleeding and her mother took her to
a doctor for an examination the following Tuesday. (T 6-14).
Dr. Gaylord Buchanan testified that he performed a
pelvic examination on the child and found no active bleeding
at that time but evidence of abrasion and of the tear or laceration at the base of the hyman was still present (T p 52-53).
The doctor stated that it was quite p1.1obable that this injury
could·have been caused by a male penis. (T p 54) but on cross
examination agreed that it could have been caused by several things within his realm of speculation (T p 56).
The prosecution as part of its case in chief called as a
witness Marlene Johnson, a half sister of Cvnthia Suzanne
Winget, who t~stified that in about 1948 and 1949 when she
was between 8 and 9 years of ag·e and while her mother was
2
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married to the defendant, that on one occasion during the
summer the defendant raped her, and on another occasion
in the summer of 1950 at Boulder Mountain, Utah, when she
was between 9 and 10, the defendant again raped her.
(T p 39-40-41-42) and that he did so again in 1952 when she
was 12 (T 42-43) and also repeated the act a month later
(T p 44). The admission of this testimony was objected to
by counsel for defendant, but the objection was overruled by
the Court (T p 38 and 39). The witness Marlene Johnson,
was at the time of the trial, 17 years of age. (T p 37). She
testified she did not relate these incidents to her mother
until just before her mother and the defendant were divorced
(T p 46) which was in 1952 (T p 31).
The defendant, Keith Winget took the stand in his own
behalf and denied that he had ever raped Cynthia Suzanne
or Marlene or had improper relations with them (T p 65-66).
He testified he and his former wife were divorced in 1952
(T p 59).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I. THE VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO LAW
AND THE EVIDENCE.
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE OF A SIMILAR OFFENSE
COMMITTED BY DEFENDANT, PRIOR IN TIME TO
1'HE DATE ON WHICH THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATION WAS ALLEGED T'O HAVE BEEN COMMITTED, WITH A DIFFERENT PARTY.
POINT III. THE COURT ERRED IN CHARGING
THE JURY AS P'ER HIS INST'RUCTION NO. 9.
POINT IV. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
3
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ARGUMENT
. POINT I. THE VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO THE
LAW AND THE EVIDENCE.
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE OF A SIMILAR OFFENSE
COMMITTED BY DEFENDANT, PRIOR IN TIME TO
THE DATE ON WHICH THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATION WAS ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED, WITH A DIFFERENT PARTY.
Because Point I and Point II are very closely connected
and because defendant contends the verdict rendered was
contrary to law by reason of the improper admission of the
testimony of Marlene Johnson, which, in a case such as this
where a man is tried for a crime so heinous and base that it
inflames the minds of even the most prudent, this testimony
could not have done otherwise than influence the jury in
their verdict, defendant will present his argument under the
first two points, together.
In this action in the State's case in chief the testimony
of Marlene Johnson now of the age of 17 years, a half sister
of the prosecutrix, was admitted over the objection of defendant was to the effect that the defendant had on four
separate occasions, some 8 or 9 years ago, when the witness
was between 8 and 9 years of age, and again when the witness was about 9 or 10 years of age, raped her. These incidents· were wholly unconnected with the crime charged and
such testimony should never have been admitted in evidence
before the Jury.
It is a well settled rule of law that evidence of other and
distinct crimes are generally inadmissible.

·It is said in Underhill on Criminal Evidence, 3rd Edition,
Chapter XV. Section 150:
4
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"General rule regarding ·evidence of crimes other
than that charged in the indictment. - The rule
which requires that all evidence which is introduced
shall be relevant to the guilt or the innocence of the
accused is applied with considerable strictness in
criminal proceedings. The wisdom and justice of
this, at least from the defendant's standpoint, are
self-evident. He can with fairness be expected to
come into court prepared to meet the accusations
contained in the indictment only, and, on this account, all the evidence offered by the prosecution
should consist wholly of facts which are within the
range and scope of its allegations. The large majority of persons of average intelligence are untrained
in logical methods of thinking, and are therefore
prone to draw illogical and incorrect inferences, and
conclusions without adequate f.oundation. From such
persons jurors are selected. They will very naturally
believe that a person is guilty of the crime with
which he is charged if it is proved to their satisfaction that he has committed a similar offense, or any
offense of an equally heinous character. And it cannot be said with truth that this tendency is wholly
without reason or j ustificaion, as every person can
bear testimony from his or her experience, that a
man who will commit one crime is very likely subsequently to commit another of the same description.
To guard against this evil, and at the same time to
avoid the delay which would be incident to an indefinite multiplication of issues·, the general rule (to
which, however, some very important exceptions may
be noted) forbids the introduction of evidence which
will show, or tend to show, that the accused has committed any crime wholly independent of that offense
for which he is on trial. (Cases cited)****"
Among the cases cited are two Utah cases, namely:
State v. Baum, 47 Utah 7, 15l,Pac. 518, in which it was
held it was not proper to show convictions of prior offenses
to prove probabilities that the defendant was guilty of the
charged offense, or to show criminal propensities. In this
case the District Attorney attempted to prove prior convictions in his main case.

5
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State v. Williams, 36 Utah 273, 103 .Pac. 250, wherein
it was held in a prosecution for rape it was reversible error
f()r the state on cross-examination of the accused to compel
him over objection to answer questions conveying the idea
that he had permitted other children to call at his home in
order that he might ravish them. And in the opinion written by Justice McCarty in this case he said, reading from
page 252 of the Pacific Reporter:

"The authorities uniformly hold in this class of cases
that where a defendant is on trial for a particular
crime evidence that he on some other occasion commited a separate and distinct crime wholly disconnected from the crime charged on some person other
than the one mentioned in the information or indictment is never admissible. 'Proof of a distinct substantive offense is never admissible unless there is
some logical connection between the two from which
it can be said that proof of the one tends to establish
the other. Thus in a prosecution for rape testimony
would not be competent that at a time not comprehended within the res gestae the defendant had committed a rape on another woman.' Gillett, Ind. & Co.,
Ev. No. 57****The same general question was involved in the case of State v. Hillberg, 22 Utah, 27,
61 Pac. 215. Mr. Justice Miner, speaking for the
court, said: 'The general rule in criminal cases, subject to exceptions, is well settled that, where one
specific offense is charged, the commission of other
offenses cannot be proven for the purpose of showing
that the defendant would have been more likely to
have committed the offense for which he was on
trial, nor as coiToborating the testimony relating
thereto; etc.' "
In line with this is the more recent case of People v.
Asavis, a California case reported in 71 Pac. 2, 307, in which
it was held that evidence of the commission of other similar
acts by defendant with persons other than the prosecutrix
are inadmissible, where defendant denied that any improper
act had taken place and no issue of innocent intent was in6
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volved. Justice Houser in his opinion under paragraph 4,
-page 309 of the Paficic Reporter, says:
"From a practical standpoint he (the defendant) is
helpless under such an accusation, with the result
that his conviction usually follows. It is for such and
similar reasons that the courts are so hesitant about
admitting, especially in the case in chief, evidence· of
the commission by defendant of other offenses of a
nature similar to that of which the defendant has
been charged. Even in criminal cases other than
those which inv-olve sexual relation:s, the ordinary
rule is applied, and is the result of recognition of the
fact that prejudice to the defendant may, and usually
does, follow from evidence that at some time in the
past he has committed some other felony. Like most
rules, that rule has its exceptions. But where no
exceptions to the general rule is applicable, the courts
have unhesitatingly announced that for a violation
of such rule a new trial must be granted."
Other recent cases in point are: People v. Wertz, 302
Pac. 2nd, 613, and People v. Buchel 296 Pac. 2nd, 113.
In Volume 16 of Corpus Juris, at page 610, the rule is
thus stated :
"Evidence of assaults by defendant upon, or acts of
intercourse with, persons other than the prosecutrix
is not admissible, unless they are parts of the same
transaction; or unless statements in respect thereto
are so connected in a confession with statements pertaining to the offense charged that it is impossible
to exclude part of the confession without excluding
all of it; or unless, according to some cases, defendant by his own testimony or otherwise claims an innocent intent."
And in the instant case, the testimony objected to does
not fall within any of the exceptions noted and was therefore erroneously admitted and could not have done otherwise
than constitute a vital element in the minds of the jury and
influenced its verdict, and as a result the defendant did not
have a fair and impartial trial to which he was entitled.
7
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POINT III. THE COURT ERRED IN CHARGING
THE JURY AS PER HIS INSTRUCTION NO. 9.
The Court instructed the Jury under its Instruction
No. 9 as follows :
"You have heard evidence of conduct of the Defendant, prior in time to the date on which the crime
charged in the Information is alleged to have been
committed, similar in nature to the offense charged
in the information.
You are instructed that if you find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt that such other acts were
in fact committed by the defendant, such evidence is
admissible for the sole purpose of showing a system,
plan, and scheme of the defendant and to prove the
lustful and lascivious disposition of the defendant
and as having a tendency to render it more probable
that acts of s.exual intercourse charged in the information were committed on or about the date alleged,
and for no other purpose."
This instruction is contrary to the law and it was error
for the Court to admit such evidence and to instruct the
jury that it was admissible to show the criminal propensities
of defendant, contrary to the decision of our Court in the
case of State v. Baum, 47 Utah 7, 151 Pac. 518, in which it
was held it was not proper to show convictions of prior offenses to prove probabilities that the defendant was guilty
of the charged offense, or to show criminal propensities.
Said instruction should not have been given as it only served
to add to the prejudicial effect of the evidence that should
not have been admitted.
POINT IV. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
For all of the reasons set forth above, defendant contends the lower Court committed error in denying the mo·g
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tion of the defendant for a new trial, and that fo:fihe reasons
submitted herein the verdict of the jury should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

J. VERNON ERICKSON,
Attorney for Appellant.
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